Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the EEOC’s War in Fighting Workplace Discrimination? by Waters, Julie L.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 44 
Number 3 (Summer 2000) Article 26 
7-20-2000 
Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the EEOC’s 
War in Fighting Workplace Discrimination? 
Julie L. Waters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julie L. Waters, Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the EEOC’s War in Fighting 
Workplace Discrimination?, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol44/iss3/26 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1155 
DOES THE BATTLE OVER MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
JEOPARDIZE THE EEOC’S WAR IN FIGHTING WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Carol Adams, an African-American, began working as an executive 
assistant at Frank’s Nursery and Crafts (Frank’s) in 1993.1  When her boss left 
in 1995, Adams was not offered a new executive assistant position that had 
been created.2  Instead, this position was offered to a Caucasian woman who 
was an outside applicant.3 Management did not give Adams the opportunity to 
submit a formal application for this position.4  She filed a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had 
been passed over for the position because of her race.5  The EEOC investigated 
the matter and concluded that Frank’s had discriminated against Adams.  The 
EEOC determined that Frank’s could not establish any valid reason why 
Adams was not qualified for the position.6  It decided to file charges under 
Title VII.7  The EEOC’s case appeared to be strong.  However, Adams, like all 
employees at Frank’s, signed an arbitration agreement mandating that she 
would settle all disputes arising out of her employment through arbitration.8  
Frank’s moved to dismiss the EEOC’s claim and to compel Adams to arbitrate, 
pursuant to this arbitration agreement.9 
Adam’s situation raised several issues that had not been addressed by any 
court.  Should the EEOC have the ability to file a court claim on Adams’ 
behalf notwithstanding her agreement to arbitrate?  If so, should the EEOC 
have the ability to pursue all remedies, although Adams could gain individual 
relief through arbitration?  It seems that these questions could be answered 
very simply through litigation.  However, courts have demonstrated difficulty 
 
 1. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 2. See id. at 453. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453. 
 7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-332, 78 Stat. 259 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id. 
 8. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452-53. 
 9. See id. at 453. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1156 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1155 
in resolving precisely what the EEOC’s role should be in fighting workplace 
discrimination when an employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement.10 
In 1998, employment discrimination claims were filed twenty-five times 
more often than in 1970.11  Presently, the increase in employment claims is 
approximately 100% greater than the increase in all other types of civil 
litigation.12  With the enormous growth in employment discrimination claims, 
there is an understandable fear that these claims will clog the federal courts, 
and create a backlog for the EEOC.13  Backlog is already a problem, and the 
number of claims continues to rise.14  It is for this reason that many employers 
have attempted to use other mechanisms to resolve employment discrimination 
claims.  One popular alternative to litigation is to require that each employee 
sign a binding arbitration agreement.15  Often, these agreements provide that an 
employee is required to submit any claims arising from employment to an 
arbitrator, in lieu of litigating the claim.16  Arbitration has allowed for an 
expansion in the kinds of claims that may be resolved, and also provides a 
forum to resolve disputes outside the judicial process and without the EEOC.17  
Employers are able to use the less costly and more efficient arbitration process 
 
 10. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452.  Compare EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 
805 (4th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).  These cases 
illustrate the circuit split that will be discussed throughout this Comment. 
 11. Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration vs. Employment Litigation, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 
78 (1999). 
 12. See id. at 78. 
 13. See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination 
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise? 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 2 (1998). 
 14. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 78.  Spelvogel notes that “There is currently a backlog 
of over 50,000 employment discrimination cases at the EEOC and thousands more at state and 
local government agencies.”  Id. 
 15. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 
8 (1997).  The popularity of arbitration agreements has become quite evident in many areas.  The 
rise of arbitration has been seen in private schools arbitrating with students, and businesses 
arbitrating with clients, as well as arbitration in employment.  Id. at 10. 
 16. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 221, 226 (1997). 
 17. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  
This was the first Supreme Court case to hold that statutory claims, not just contractual claims, 
could be arbitrated in a workplace context.  Id. at 640.  See also John W.R. Murray, The 
Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Mandatory Arbitration of Federal Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 295-96 (1999).  A benefit of arbitration over the judicial 
process is that claims that may not be pursued by the EEOC in court proceedings because they are 
considered relatively insignificant, involving only one employee or isolated incidents, will be 
heard in an arbitration proceeding.  Id. at 296-97. 
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in almost any work-related claim, making these agreements valuable and 
explaining their growth in popularity among employers.18 
With the current expansion of arbitration in the workplace, courts have 
attempted to determine the validity and utility of various arbitration 
agreements.19  Without an arbitration agreement, when an employee wishes to 
file a complaint claiming discrimination, the enforcement of the claim is 
delegated to the EEOC by statute.20  However, when an employee has signed a 
binding arbitration agreement, the role of the EEOC changes.  In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court held that binding 
mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable with regard to employment 
discrimination claims.21  The Court’s holding in Gilmer is important because it 
answered several questions relating to the role of the EEOC and the position 
arbitration should play in employment discrimination disputes.22 
While explaining that arbitration agreements are enforceable regarding 
employment discrimination claims, the Gilmer majority did not discuss the 
extent to which a binding arbitration agreement prevents the EEOC from 
bringing a claim to a judicial forum.23  When there is no arbitration agreement, 
the EEOC may seek a variety of equitable and legal remedies through 
litigation.24  However, the effect of a binding arbitration agreement on the 
EEOC’s authority to pursue all statutory remedies is unclear. 
There has generally been agreement that the EEOC may seek equitable 
relief on behalf of the public interest, notwithstanding a binding arbitration 
 
 18. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 80.  Spelvogel notes, “[I]n the past several years, more 
than 40 well-known employers have set up mandatory arbitration programs covering over two 
million employees.” Id. at 81. 
 19. See Samuel Estreicher, PreDispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment 
Claims, 72 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1344, 1344 (1997). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  A litigant must first gain a right to sue by 
filing a charge with the EEOC.  The EEOC then investigates the claim.  If the EEOC believes that 
discrimination took place, it may prosecute the claim in its own name, or it may allow an 
individual claimant to pursue the claim on his or her own behalf.  Id. 
 21. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  See also 
infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Gilmer decision). 
 22. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. 
 23. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 461 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32).  Although the Gilmer majority stated that an individual claimant could 
still file charges with the EEOC notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement, it did not 
discuss which remedies would be available to the EEOC pursuant to its authority. See Frank’s 
Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).  The EEOC may seek injunctive relief, reinstatement of the 
employee into his or her former position, or a comparable position.  Additionally, the EEOC may 
seek monetary damages, including back pay and/or punitive relief on behalf of the employee 
claiming discrimination.  See id. 
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agreement.25  However, a disagreement has developed regarding whether the 
EEOC is able to recover damages on an employee’s behalf.  The Second and 
Fourth Circuits agree that the EEOC is precluded from seeking a monetary 
remedy on behalf of an individual who has signed a binding arbitration 
agreement.26  The Sixth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding that the EEOC may exercise its delegated authority to pursue all 
remedies, including monetary damages on an employee’s behalf.27  The EEOC 
typically argues that because Congress has delegated to it the authority to 
obtain equitable and legal remedies, the EEOC should have the ability to seek 
these remedies, notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement.28  
Additionally, the EEOC argues that it must have the ability to seek monetary 
damages so it can properly protect the public interest in eliminating workplace 
discrimination.29  The EEOC concluded that equitable relief simply cannot 
further its goal of protecting the public interest adequately.30 
In contrast, employers typically argue that the EEOC serves the public 
interest sufficiently through equitable relief.31  Supporting this argument, 
employers are able to point to the federal policy favoring enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, thus requiring the Court to “rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate.”32  Employers have also argued that by allowing the 
EEOC to pursue damages on an individual’s behalf, arbitration agreements will 
become almost completely ineffective.33  Clearly, there are competing interests 
regarding the goals of the EEOC and the strong federal policy of encouraging 
arbitration.  Thus, the question remains, what effect does a binding arbitration 
agreement have on the EEOC’s authority to pursue all available remedies? 
 
 25. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1999).  Courts have 
allowed the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief even if an individual has previously waived or 
settled a claim because injunctive relief assists the EEOC in its goal of pursuing the public 
interest.  Id. at 811. 
 26. See generally EEOC v. Kidder Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998).  See 
also Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807. 
 27. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468. 
 28. See generally EEOC Notice (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/ 
mandarb.text> (describing EEOC’s policy statement on mandatory arbitration as of July 10, 
1997) [hereinafter EEOC Notice].  See generally Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461. 
 29. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28.  The EEOC argues that the courts play a “crucial role” 
in defining workplace discrimination, making it part of the public record, and deterring future 
discrimination for the public.  Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 302. 
 32. See id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)). 
 33. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 465-66 (citing Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303).  Employers 
and courts have argued that by allowing the EEOC to seek monetary damages on an individual’s 
behalf, the individual is able to “make an end run around the arbitration agreement by having the 
EEOC pursue back pay . . . .”  Id. at 466 (quoting Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303). 
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This Comment will examine the effect that binding arbitration has on the 
right of the EEOC to obtain a monetary remedy on the employee’s behalf.  Part 
II will include a historical discussion of the statutes, cases, and policies leading 
to this remedies problem.34  Part III, an analysis of the opinions by three 
circuits attempting to resolve this issue, demonstrates the strong disagreement 
among the circuits.35   Part IV, the Critical Analysis, will discuss why it is not 
logical or beneficial to allow the EEOC to pursue monetary damages after an 
employee has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. It will also discuss 
why it is extremely important in the EEOC’s fight against discrimination in the 
workplace that the EEOC have the ability to pursue injunctive relief.36  Part V 
will conclude this Comment by forecasting the success of this solution.  
Additionally, this section will offer ideas for successful implementation of this 
solution.37 
II.  HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE EEOC’S ENFORCEMENT 
OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
The problem regarding what relief the EEOC may recover on behalf of an 
individual who has signed a binding arbitration agreement has arisen 
recently.38  Precedence has played a substantial role in bringing this specific 
issue to the courts.  A discussion regarding the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA),39 the statutes delegating authority to the EEOC,40 and courts’ 
interpretations of these statutes, provides a historical background as to the 
evolution of this problem. 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Birth of the EEOC 
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC began 
operating as the primary enforcement agency to stop employment 
discrimination.41  When Congress enacted The Civil Rights Act, the EEOC’s 
 
 34. See infra notes 38-205 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 206-68 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 269-322 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300-01.  This was the first appellate decision to reach this issue.  
It was delivered by the Second Circuit on August 28, 1998.  Id. 
 39. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
621 (1994).  These are the statutes that will be discussed throughout this Comment.  They are 
enforced by the EEOC, although there are other statutes delegating authority to the EEOC as well. 
 41. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: An Overview (visited Feb. 29, 
2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/Overview.html>. 
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authority was restricted compared to the authority that it has today.42  At that 
time, Congress authorized the EEOC “to investigate charges of employment 
discrimination and to pursue informal methods of conciliation in efforts to 
resolve those charges.”43  The EEOC’s involvement ended after using informal 
methods to resolve workplace discrimination.44  Consequently, if the EEOC 
did not correct discrimination by informal methods,45 the individual 
complaining of discrimination was responsible for bringing his or her claim to 
court.46  In this way, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, in its original form, left 
formal enforcement of anti-discrimination statutes largely to the discretion of 
individual employees.47 
In 1972, Congress recognized that the authority granted to the EEOC was 
inadequate to fight discrimination.48  In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the 
Supreme Court noted:  “[T]he most striking deficiency of the 1964 Act is that 
the EEOC does not have the authority to issue judicially enforceable orders to 
back up its findings of discrimination . . . [this] burden of obtaining 
enforceable relief rests upon each individual victim of discrimination. . . .”49  
Congress noted that this was a burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming 
process for individuals.50  Therefore, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
amended to allow the EEOC to bring employment discrimination claims in 
federal court after informal attempts at conciliation had failed.51  However, 
these amendments only authorized the EEOC to sue for specific relief, such as 
reinstatement or back pay.52  Consequently, the remedies and actions available 
to the EEOC were still quite limited.  Additionally, the amendments allowed 
aggrieved employees to retain the right to bring their own claims.  Still, the 
EEOC enjoyed a 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction.53  After the 1972 
 
 42. See generally EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455-59 (6th Cir. 
1999).  Here, the court demonstrates the evolution of the EEOC since 1964, when it was first 
promulgated by statute.  Id. 
 43. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994 & Supp. III 
1997)). 
 44. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259. 
 45. The EEOC was statutorily delegated to use informal methods of persuasion.  EEOC v. 
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). 
 46. Id. 
 47. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259.  See also Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 457. 
 48. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980).  The purpose of the 1972 
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to secure more effective enforcement of Title 
VII.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 326 n.7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
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amendments, the EEOC was able to bring actions in federal court, instead of 
simply trying to work with employers and employees on an informal basis.  In 
addition, public court proceedings played a great role in stopping present 
discrimination and in deterring future discrimination.54 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for more expansive remedies, such 
as punitive damages in situations involving intentional discrimination.55  These 
amendments also endorsed the use of alternative dispute resolution methods, 
including arbitration, to resolve claims arising under anti-discrimination 
statutes “where appropriate and to the extent authorized by the law.”56  This 
legislation demonstrated Congressional recognition that arbitration should be 
used in at least some employment discrimination claims.  Passage of The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 demonstrated awareness that not all employment 
discrimination claims must be heard in federal court in order to obtain a valid 
and just result. 
B. The Federal Arbitration Act 
In order to analyze arbitration concerning the EEOC, it is necessary to look 
at the historical framework of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Congressional 
recognition of arbitration began much earlier than the EEOC’s.57  Neither the 
public nor the courts accepted arbitration in the employment discrimination 
context until long after the first federal laws relating to arbitration were 
promulgated.58  Federal acceptance and approval of arbitration had its 
 
 54. See generally EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456-57 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
 55. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 56. § 118, 105 Stat. at 1081.  It is important to note that this bill to amend the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was signed by President Bush only a few months after the decision in Gilmer was 
delivered by the Court.  The amendments demonstrate an attempt by Congress to allocate greater 
control over workplace discrimination to the EEOC.  Karen Halverson, Arbitration and The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445, 446-48 (1999). 
  It has also been argued that Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to 
give employers less of an opportunity to use arbitration agreements and to effectively overrule the 
holding in Gilmer.  See id.  In 1998, in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit 
decided that §118 meant that any mandatory arbitration agreement, very similar to that in Gilmer, 
should not be upheld because it is compulsory upon accepting employment.  114 F.3d 1182 (9th 
Cir. 1998).  So far, it does not appear that other circuits have followed this line of reasoning.  See 
generally Robert S. McArthur, Arbitrary Civil Rights?  The Case of Duffield v. Robertson 
Stephens, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 881 (1999).  See generally Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 
175 (3d Cir. 1998).  The Seus decision demonstrates a strong disagreement with the Duffield 
court on the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its arbitration policy.  Id. at 183. 
 57. See Wilko v. Swan, 367 U.S. 427, 429 (1953) (discussing the history of the Federal 
Arbitration Act). 
 58. See id. at 430.  This was the first Supreme Court decision regarding arbitration in an 
employment context.  In Wilko, the Court determined that an agreement to arbitrate could not 
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beginnings in 1925, when Congress approved the United States Arbitration 
Act.59 
When Congress originally enacted this statute, it expressed a policy 
favoring arbitration in the business community.60  In 1947, Congress reenacted 
the law, naming it the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).61  Courts have 
acknowledged that Congress enacted the FAA “to reverse the longstanding 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common 
law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”62  Courts have since 
held that the FAA demonstrates a Congressional policy favoring arbitration.63  
Should the EEOC’s right to bring a claim for all remedies be hindered when 
arbitration agreements are upheld in an employment discrimination context?  
The evolution of the cases and public perception concerning employment 
discrimination are discussed in the sections that follow. 
C. The EEOC and Arbitration: Two Competing Interests Collide 
In 1974, the authority granted to the EEOC collided with a strong policy 
favoring arbitration in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co.,64 a case involving a 
mandatory arbitration agreement in the collective bargaining context.65  
Alexander, a discharged African-American worker wanted to file a lawsuit 
under Title VII66 for wrongful termination and discriminatory practices.67  
However, Alexander was a union member, and, therefore, was covered under 
the union’s collective bargaining agreement.68  This agreement mandated 
arbitration in all disputes arising from employment.69  After arbitrating in 
 
preclude an employee from going to court based on the same claim.  Id. at 438.  See also 
Halverson, supra note 56, at 453. 
 59. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 60. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983).  See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Stevens discusses the fact that when the FAA was enacted, it 
was for the purpose of giving merchants a right to arbitrate damages if they wanted to do so.  Id. 
 61. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14. 
 62.  See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 
(1985)). 
 63. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).  See 
also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
 64. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 65. See id. at 39. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  In order to bring an action under Title 
VII, the claimant must first obtain a “right to sue letter” from the EEOC.  Id. 
 67. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 39-42.  The collective bargaining agreement stated that disputes had to be 
submitted to a “multistep grievance procedure” which culminated at compulsory arbitration.  Id. 
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accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that 
Alexander was discharged for proper reasons.70  The EEOC subsequently 
dismissed Alexander’s claim.71  Alexander then filed a Title VII action in 
federal court.72 
The issue presented to the Court was whether Alexander had a right to 
bring his claim under Title VII, despite the mandatory arbitration clause 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.73  In Alexander, the Court 
held that an employee could bring the Title VII claim although he was a union 
member.74  Justice Powell’s majority opinion distinguished employee claims 
involving employment contracts from those claims involving an individual’s 
statutory rights.75  Justice Powell reasoned that an individual’s statutory rights, 
such as those granted under Title VII, could not be relinquished through a 
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate.76  Furthermore, the majority found 
that the agreement in Alexander did not clearly state that the arbitration clause 
would cover statutory claims in addition to covering contractual issues.77  The 
Alexander majority also expressed a general skepticism regarding the 
arbitration process.  Justice Powell’s majority opinion demonstrated distrust in 
arbitrators, stating that arbitrators may not be qualified to handle situations 
involving statutory rights, like those promulgated under Title VII.78  The 
majority also noted deficiencies in fact-finding in arbitration.79  For these 
reasons, the majority concluded that Alexander’s claim under Title VII could 
be pursued in federal court, notwithstanding the collective bargaining 
 
 70. Id. at 42. 
 71. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42.  In his decision, the arbitrator failed to mention any of the 
employee’s claims of racial discrimination regarding his discharge, stating only that the employee 
had been “discharged for just cause.”  Id. at 42-43. 
 72. Id. at 43. 
 73. See id.  Gardner-Denver argued that the arbitration was a sufficient remedy, and moved 
to dismiss the lawsuit.  See id. 
 74. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60.  The Court stated that the EEOC’s important interest in 
stopping discrimination indicated that the federal courts should be allowed to determine Title VII 
claims and that “deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent . . . .” Id. at 56. 
 75. See id. at 51-52.  The Court stated that because the employee wanted to bring his claim 
under Title VII, this was a statutory or individual claim that had not been clearly covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement.  See id. 
 76. Id. at 52.  It was not clear at this time whether the distinction between statutory and 
contract claims would also be applied if an individual entered into a binding arbitration contract, 
without the presence of a collective bargaining agreement.  See generally Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 (1991). 
 77. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 n.6 (“[W]e hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration 
does not establish that an arbitrator’s resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory 
claim under Title VII.”). 
 78. See id. at 57 (“[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law 
of the shop, not the law of the land.”). 
 79. Id. at 57. 
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agreement mandating arbitration.80  For many years, the Alexander holding 
was cited for the proposition that no arbitration agreement could prevent an 
employee from bringing a discrimination claim in federal court.81 
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld and expanded the Alexander 
decision, allowing employees to bring statutory claims against their employers 
despite having a valid arbitration agreement in place.82  In Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems Inc., the Court allowed employees to bring an 
action in federal court alleging that their employer had violated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act despite finding that employees were covered by a binding 
arbitration agreement.83  As in Alexander, employees were able to bring 
statutory claims, even when they had previously arbitrated the claims 
unsuccessfully.84  The Court stood by its rationale in Alexander, stating that 
statutory claims would not be foreclosed by participation in an arbitration 
agreement even when the agreement called for arbitration as the exclusive 
remedy.85 
In 1984, the Court decided McDonald v. City of West Branch, which also 
allowed employees to bring statutory claims notwithstanding a collective 
bargaining agreement.  86  As in Alexander, the Court in McDonald continued 
to question the qualifications and expertise of arbitrators in arbitrating 
individual statutory rights.87  This evidenced the Court’s hesitancy to allow 
arbitration as a final option for employees. 
An examination of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1985 
demonstrate that the judicial attitude toward arbitration agreements in 
employment began to shift significantly to a policy favoring arbitration.88  In 
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,89 the Court enforced an 
 
 80. Id. at 59-60. 
 81. See McArthur, supra note 56, at 888-89 (citing Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 194 (D. Mass. 1998)). 
 82. See generally Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).  See 
also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). 
 83. 450 U.S. at 728-31. 
 84. See id. at 734.  After employees submitted a claim to arbitration through the collective 
bargaining agreement and received an adverse result, the Court allowed the claim to be heard in 
federal court.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 745-46. 
 86. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292. The Court stated that the full faith and credit did not 
require the courts to give a preclusive effect to arbitration awards when an employee claimed that 
his statutory rights had been violated.  See id. 
 87. See id. at 290.  The Court stated that an arbitrator does not have the expertise required to 
solve the “complex legal questions” that may arise in statutory actions.  See id. 
 88. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) See 
also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).  See 
generally Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985). 
 89. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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arbitration agreement for antitrust claims brought under the Sherman Act.90  
Citing Alexander, Soler argued that because there was a statutory claim at issue 
and because that claim was not specified in the agreement to arbitrate, Soler 
should not be compelled to arbitrate the dispute.91  The Court disagreed with 
Soler’s argument, holding that there was a federal policy favoring arbitration, 
which required the Court to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”92  
The Court additionally held that there was no legislative history preventing a 
party from including or excluding statutory claims in an arbitration 
agreement.93 
In Mitsubishi, the Court also stated it was no longer suspicious or skeptical 
of the arbitration process.94  This suggested that the courts might generally 
uphold arbitration agreements involving statutory employment claims.  The 
Court stated that by entering an agreement to arbitrate, a party has not 
foreclosed any rights delegated by federal statute.95  The Court held, instead, 
the party has merely agreed to settle the dispute in an alternative forum.96  In 
Mitsubishi, the Court concluded that it would uphold arbitration agreements 
unless there was a clear intent that Congress favored a waiver of judicial 
remedies for a particular statute.97  Thus, the Court demonstrated a newly-
found willingness to enforce arbitration agreements for statutory claims.  With 
the Mitsubishi decision, exceptions to what would be considered arbitrable in 
an employment context started to dwindle.98 
 
 90. Id. at 619-20. 
 91. Id. at 626.  The arbitration agreement, as provided in Paragraph IV of the sales 
agreement states, “All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between 
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to [other articles of employment contract] . . . shall 
be finally settled by arbitration. . . .” Id. at 617. 
 92. Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221). 
 93. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.  Compare this to the holding in Alexander, where the Court 
seemed to infer that arbitration agreements would only be enforced for statutory claims if 
statutory claims were explicitly mentioned in the arbitration agreement. 
 94. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.  Additionally, the Mitsubishi Court stated that it was 
past the time when judicial suspicion of arbitration and the competence of arbitrators should 
inhibit court enforcement of agreements.  Id. 
 95. See id. at 628. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 650. 
 98. There were two other Supreme Court decisions that upheld enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in a statutory context.  See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).  See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989).  Rodriguez de Quijas expressly overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wilko v. Swan.  Id.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
  These described cases have become known as “The Mitsubishi Trilogy.”  See Justin M. 
Dean, Going, Going, Almost Gone: The Loss of Employees’ Rights to Bring Statutory 
Discrimination Claims in Court.  63 MO. L. REV. 801, 810 (1998) (“The Mitsubishi Trilogy 
provided a new foundation for the Supreme Court’s evolving view on the role of arbitration in the 
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There are several reasons for this shift in attitude.  In Mitsubishi, the Court 
reasoned that arbitration agreements could either include or exclude statutory 
claims.99  Thus, if employers wanted to include statutory claims and the 
legislative history did not indicate an intent to exclude such claims, the Court 
would enforce the arbitration agreement.100  The Court looked to the legislative 
history and reasoned that if Congress did not intend specific claims to be 
arbitrated, the statute would so provide.101  A new-found trust and acceptance 
of arbitrators also accounts for the Court’s acceptance of arbitration of 
statutory claims.102  Additionally, a change in the composition of the Court that 
decided Alexander set the stage for the changing views regarding arbitration.103 
Although the Court’s acceptance of arbitration was quite significant in 
Mitsubishi, the decision did not overrule Alexander.  Unlike Alexander, the 
issues in Mitsubishi did not involve a collective bargaining context.  This 
difference also seemed to factor into the Court’s decision.104  Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. demonstrates the profound impact on the 
individual employee’s ability to bring employment discrimination claims to 
court when that employee signs an arbitration agreement.105 
D. Arbitration and the EEOC’s Anti-Discrimination Laws Collide in Gilmer 
1. Setting the Stage for Gilmer 
The Mitsubishi decision made clear the Court’s willingness to enforce 
arbitration agreements when statutory claims were involved.106  
Simultaneously, the Court was reacting to the EEOC’s significant increase of 
authority granted by the 1972 amendments to The Civil Rights Act of 1964.107  
In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court carefully examined the 
1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, holding that the EEOC had a right to 
 
employment context.  These cases established that statutory claims were arbitrable.  The next step 
was to allow arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.”). 
 99. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. 
 100. See Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 995 F. Supp. 190, 195-96 
(D. Mass. 1998) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27). 
 101. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Corp.:  A Major Step Forward for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision? 7 LAB. LAW. 823, 832 (1991).  
Duston comments on how these decisions gave the Rehnquist Court the opportunity to reexamine 
Alexander. Id. 
 104. See generally McArthur, supra note 56, at 889 (discussing the Court’s maintenance of 
precedence in Alexander). 
 105. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
 106. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.  The 1972 amendments delegated the 
EEOC significantly more authority, allowing it to pursue claims in its own name. 
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sue independent of any individual employee’s rights.108  This meant that the 
EEOC could sue on its own behalf, and did not have to sue on behalf of the 
individual employee, nor could an individual employee stop the EEOC from 
pursuing the claim.109 
Additionally, in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, the Court 
interpreted the 1972 amendments to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the EEOC 
over an employment discrimination claim for 180 days.110  The EEOC 
demonstrated broad authority to police workplace discrimination when courts 
began to interpret Title VII to mean that an individual could not withdraw a 
charge from the EEOC without the EEOC’s permission.111  Additionally, 
several courts have observed that an individual may not “agree to deny to the 
EEOC the information it needs to advance . . . public interest.  A waiver of the 
right to file a charge is void as against public policy.”112  Courts have also 
interpreted the 1972 amendments to state that the EEOC has complete 
authority to decide what cases to bring in federal court.113 
Clearly, the decisions reached in the seventeen years between Alexander 
and Gilmer illustrate a considerable change in judicial attitude, giving the 
EEOC greater power to stop discrimination for the public interest, and for the 
interest of individual employees.114  At the same time, courts no longer 
demonstrated a judicial suspicion regarding competency of arbitrators and their 
ability to resolve statutory claims.115  However, the Supreme Court still had not 
determined whether individual employment agreements mandating arbitration 
would be consistently enforced.  Congress had recently delegated additional 
authority to the EEOC in the battle against workplace discrimination, and 
following the 1972 amendments, and the courts also expanded the EEOC’s 
authority.116  In the context of collective bargaining, it seemed well settled that 
statutory claims, such as those authorizing the EEOC to act, could be heard in 
federal court.117 
 
 108. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 466 U.S. 318, 329 (1980).  In General Telephone, the 
Court held that, because of the broad power of the 1972 amendments to The Civil Rights Act, the 
EEOC could seek class-wide relief without being certified.  Id. at 320. 
 109. See id. at 331. 
 110. 432 U.S. 355, 366 (1977). 
 111. See EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1991)). 
 112. EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987).  See generally Goodyear 
Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1542-43. 
 113. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 114. See supra notes 82-105 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.  The Mitsubishi decision recognizes that 
there is no longer any reason to be skeptical of arbitration agreements. 
 116. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974). 
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2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Court’s Expanding 
View in Mitsubishi Extends to Employment Discrimination Claims 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., an employee working as a 
manager in a financial service corporation was required to sign a mandatory 
binding arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment.118  This 
agreement stated that he would resolve any work-related controversy through 
arbitration.119  At age sixty-two, Gilmer’s employment was terminated and he 
wanted to bring a claim stating that his employer had violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).120  When Gilmer filed his 
complaint with the EEOC, his employer filed a motion to compel arbitration.121  
For the first time, the Supreme Court decided whether a claim brought by the 
EEOC under the ADEA could be subjected to a compulsory arbitration 
agreement signed by an individual employee.122 
In a 7-2 decision, Justice White’s majority opinion held that Gilmer’s 
discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration.123  The majority 
further noted that Gilmer was still free to file charges with the EEOC despite 
signing this agreement.124  Justice White was not persuaded by Gilmer’s 
argument that the role of the EEOC to protect the public would be undermined 
by arbitration.125  The majority reasoned that the EEOC had a mission of 
furthering public and social policies, as well as individual rights.126  The EEOC 
could, therefore, still pursue its goal in protecting the public interest even if 
individuals who signed mandatory arbitration agreements were forced to 
arbitrate accordingly.127  The majority concluded that nothing in statutes or 
 
 118. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  Gilmer’s employment required that he register with several 
stock exchanges.  His registration for the New York Stock Exchange contained a provision which 
stated that any controversy arising out of employment must be submitted to arbitration.  Id. 
 119. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).  See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id.  The employer relied on an arbitration agreement in the registration application, and, 
additionally, on the Federal Arbitration Act.  Id. at 24 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998)). 
 122. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 28. 
 125. Id.  The court stated that it found the employee’s argument that enforcing arbitration 
would undermine the purpose of the EEOC very unpersuasive.  The individual would still have 
the ability to file charges with the EEOC, even though the private action now had to be settled 
through arbitration.  The EEOC’s authority remains regardless of any arbitration agreement.  Id. 
 126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. 
 127. Id. at 28.  Here, Justice White relied on Mitsubishi, holding that, “[S]o long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”  Id. (quoting 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
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legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude arbitration 
as a remedy in ADEA cases.128 
Gilmer argued that the Court’s decision in Alexander precluded arbitration 
of employment discrimination claims.129  The majority explained that Gilmer’s 
reliance on Alexander and the decisions that followed its reasoning was 
unfounded for two reasons.130  First, it distinguished Gilmer from Alexander 
because Alexander involved a collective bargaining agreement.131  In Gilmer, 
the employee signed an individual agreement with the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to arbitrate all claims arising out of his employment.132  The 
Court stated that, unlike the claim in Alexander, Gilmer’s individual statutory 
claim had not been undermined by a collective bargaining agreement.133  The 
Gilmer majority further stated that statutory rights are individual rights that 
may be undermined by a group interest in a collective bargaining agreement.134  
This reasoning implies there is no such concern in individual agreements.135  
The Gilmer majority further distinguished the case from Alexander, stating that 
Gilmer had signed a clear agreement to arbitrate all claims.136  The Gilmer 
Court interpreted Gilmer’s agreement to include both statutory and contractual 
claims;137 whereas in Alexander, the Court held that the collective bargaining 
agreement at issue clearly called for arbitration of only contractual claims.138 
Finally, the Court reiterated its endorsement of arbitration as a satisfactory 
process under which an employee can bring an ADEA claim.139  Looking to its 
opinion in Mitsubishi, the majority emphasized the capability of arbitrators to 
 
 128. Id. at 28-29.  (“[T]he mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement 
of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration.”) 
 129. Id. at 33.  See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). 
 130. See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35. 
 131. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.  See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39. 
 132. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
 133. Id. at 34.  The Court distinguished an employee’s contractual rights from his statutory 
rights.  The Court stated that statutory rights are individual rights that may be undermined by a 
collective bargaining agreement because it is for the benefit of the entire group, instead of 
individuals.  Contractual rights in a collective bargaining agreement can be pursued through 
arbitration because they will look out for the best possible interest of the contracting group, which 
is also acceptable for individuals. See id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 34.  The Gilmer majority reasoned, “[T]he interests of the individual employee 
may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.”  See id. 
(citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19). 
 136. See id. at 35. 
 137. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. 
 138. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974). 
 139. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 481 (1987)). Several rules ensure that arbitrators are acting prudently, and not 
fraudulently. See id. at 30. 
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arbitrate statutory claims.140  The Court noted that Mitsubishi clearly 
established arbitration as a fair process.141  Additionally, the majority pointed 
out that the NYSE had promulgated several rules to ensure fairness in 
arbitration.142  Thus, the Court held that there was no valid reason for Gilmer 
to forego arbitration.143 
What did the Gilmer decision mean to the future of arbitration agreements 
in an employment discrimination context?  Courts have generally interpreted 
Gilmer to mean that mandatory arbitration agreements must be enforced, not 
only in cases involving ADEA claims, but also in cases involving the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII.144  However, several post-
Gilmer decisions continue to raise issues regarding the adequacy of specific 
employment arbitration agreements.145 
 
 140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624).  See also Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Mitsubishi Motor Corp., v. Soler 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). 
 141. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31.  The Gilmer decision discusses preceding cases, which state 
that arbitration is a fair and just forum for employment discrimination; FAA provisions that 
protect against biased arbitrators; and NYSE rules set out to make arbitration a fair process in the 
securities industry.  Id. at 30 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 142. Id. at 31-32.  The Gilmer majority recognizes several NYSE rules that were enacted to 
make the arbitration process fair in the securities industry, stating that “The NYSE rules, 
however, do require that all arbitration awards be in writing, and that the awards contain the 
names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award 
issued.”  Id.  The Gilmer majority also recognizes several N.Y.S.E. provisions designed to make 
the discovery process adequate for the arbitration proceedings.  See id. at 31. 
 143. Id. at 35. 
 144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. But cf. Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens & 
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Ninth Circuit decision in Duffield is the exception to this 
general rule that arbitration agreements must be enforced regarding employment discrimination 
claims.  Id. at 1194-96. 
  See 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1994); 42 U.S.C. 2000e(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  See 
generally Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Containers, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-82 (6th Cir. 
1999); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. 
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 145. For example, in Cole v. Burns International Security Services, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia held that an employer could not require an employee to arbitrate every 
dispute arising from employment, without some mechanism for meaningful judicial review.  
Additionally, the Court held that an employer could not require an employee to pay all or part of 
fees involved in arbitration.  See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468-69. 
  Additionally, in DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., the court held that attorney’s fees 
could not be denied in disregard of Title VII, because the employee had arbitrated instead of 
using the judicial process. 983 F. Supp 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
  Recently, in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit recognized that pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate would be enforced.  However, the court held that when the 
agreement is illusory, or has no consideration, it is unenforceable, just like any other contract.  
173 F.3d at 940. 
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E. The Aftermath: Reactions to Gilmer 
The Gilmer decision prompted reactions from various special interest 
groups.  These reactions are important to identifying remedies available to the 
EEOC because each group demonstrated and hypothesized the effects that 
mandatory arbitration would have on the EEOC’s ability to stop 
discrimination.  Some suggest that one way to alleviate these effects is to allow 
the EEOC to pursue all remedies, without regard to an agreement mandating 
arbitration.146  However, others have argued that this would only make the 
situation more complicated because arbitration agreements are helpful, in some 
way, to employers, employees, and the EEOC.147  These reactions also 
demonstrate the effects of mandatory arbitration on the public interest. 
1. The EEOC’s View 
Understandably, the EEOC has expressed a strong opinion about the 
enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements.148  In a 1997 Policy 
Statement, the EEOC expressed a strong disapproval of binding mandatory 
arbitration agreements.149  The Policy Statement was issued during a time 
when a growing number of employers required applicants to sign arbitration 
agreements as a condition of employment.150  The EEOC explained its belief 
that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make enforcement of 
anti-discrimination laws in the workplace a top priority.151  The Policy 
Statement asserted that the federal government has primary responsibility for 
enforcement of employment discrimination laws for the private interest and the 
public interest.152  The Policy Statement also opined that courts are responsible 
to develop and interpret laws governing the EEOC and employment 
discrimination.153 
It is important to observe that many of the EEOC’s arguments in its 1997 
Policy Statement focus on the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest, 
rather than its role in protecting individual employees from discriminatory 
 
 146. See infra notes 148-62 and accompanying text. 
 147. See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text. 
 148. See generally EEOC Notice, supra note 28. 
 149. Id. The 1997 Policy Statement states that “agreements that mandate binding arbitration 
of discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental principles 
evinced in [U.S. employment discrimination] laws.”  Id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)); H.R. REP. NO. 
88-914, pt. 2 (1963) (separate views of Rep. McCullough et al.)). 
 152. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28.  The 1997 Policy Statement states that statutory 
considerations should be the concern of the court, and that because the EEOC is set forth by 
statute, the federal courts should have the ultimate responsibility in constructing the meaning of 
its duties.  Id. 
 153. Id. 
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behavior.154  The Policy Statement reasons that because courts contain public 
records, and are a significant part of public life, judicial decisions are 
necessary for the EEOC’s enforcement scheme because they promote non-
discriminatory behavior in two ways.  First, the public nature of litigation 
ensures that the public will observe awards meant to punish a discriminating 
employer.155  In this way, judicial decision-making forces employers to be 
accountable to the public for their actions.156  Second, employers will observe 
the legal consequences of workplace discrimination.157  In this way, litigation 
helps deter future discrimination by other employers and protects the public 
interest.158  The EEOC claims that mandatory arbitration does not fulfill either 
of these goals because the very nature of arbitration is private instead of 
public.159 
Additionally, the EEOC argues that arbitration awards cannot be 
overturned by the same mechanism used by courts in overturning decisions.160  
According to the EEOC, arbitration does not create precedent, nor does it 
expand and reinterpret law, like a court decision.161  In this way, the EEOC 
argues that arbitration does not effectively serve the public interest.162 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. The EEOC Policy Statement discusses the nature of the judicial process and litigation 
by stating: 
Through its public nature [the judicial process as opposed to arbitration proceedings]— 
manifested through published decisions— the exercise of judicial authority is subject to 
public scrutiny and system-wide checks and balances. . .[w]hen courts fail to interpret or 
apply the anti-discrimination laws in accord with the values underlying them, they are 
subject to correction by higher level courts and by Congress. 
Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28.  The EEOC policy statement explains that it has been 
proven many times that the “risks of negative publicity and blemished business reputation can be 
powerful influences on behavior.”  Id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id.  The EEOC policy statement notes that arbitral decisions are not published and, 
therefore, do not assist in stopping discriminatory behavior the same way that published court 
opinions do.  Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. EEOC Notice, supra note 28.  In its latest policy statement on the matter, the EEOC fails 
to discuss the limited judicial review of arbitration awards. The Court may overrule an arbitrator’s 
decision when there is evidence of fraud or corruption by the arbitrators, or by a demonstration 
that the arbitrator has a bias against one of the parties. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994 & 
Supp. IV. 1998).  This section of the Federal Arbitration Act states: 
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the 
[arbitration] award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application 
of any party to the arbitration—(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
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2. The National Academy of Arbitrators’ View 
The National Academy of Arbitrators (the Academy) is another group that 
has taken notice of the Gilmer holding.  In 1997, the Academy issued a 
statement opposing the use of mandatory arbitration in employment 
discrimination claims.163  However, the Academy stated that as long as the 
Gilmer standard governing mandatory arbitration agreements in individual 
employment is still the law, it will continue to arbitrate employment 
discrimination disputes pursuant to such agreements.164 
3. The Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations’ 
View 
In a 1994 report, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations (the Commission) also spoke out on mandatory arbitration 
agreements, stating that binding arbitration agreements should not be 
enforceable.165  The Commission stated that there should be several routes that 
an employee may take when he or she has a discrimination complaint.166 The 
Commission further recognized that the use of mandatory arbitration 
agreements is likely to continue, and that due process guarantees must be 
protected.167  Consequently, the Commission listed goals for employers in 
creating an arbitration system to be used relating to employment discrimination 
claims.168  The Commission stated that in order to provide sufficient due 
process, arbitration agreements needed to allow for remedies equal to those 
 
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party 
have been prejudiced. (4) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the 
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, 
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
 Id. 
 163. See National Academy of Arbitrators, Statement of the National Academy of Arbitrators 
On Individual Contracts Of Employment and Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory Claims 
Under Employer- Promulgated Systems (last visited Mar. 19, 2000) <http://www.naarb.org/guide 
lines.html> [hereinafter, National Academy of Arbitrators].  (“The National Academy of 
Arbitrators opposes mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of employment when it 
requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of 
statutory rights.”)  See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 220-21. 
 164. See generally National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 163. 
 165. See generally Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. Dep’ts 
of Commerce and Labor, Commission on Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and 
Recommendations (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Dunlop Report].  The Commission was headed by 
John Dunlop, former Secretary of Labor. 
 166. See id. at 28. 
 167. See id. at 31.  Among the guarantees suggested were: a jointly selected neutral arbitrator, 
adequate discovery, cost-sharing, and a written opinion of the award granted.  See Dunlop Report, 
supra note 165, at 31. 
 168. See id. 
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available through the judicial process.169  It also stated that the arbitration 
process should allow for a neutral arbitrator who, “knows the laws in question 
and understands the concerns of the parties.”170  Furthermore, the Commission 
recognized that because of the EEOC’s severe backlog, it is necessary to have 
alternatives to the judicial process, otherwise, not all claims would be resolved 
adequately.171  Clearly, the Commission recognized that arbitration agreements 
in employment discrimination serve a useful purpose.172 
4. Other Important Policy Views 
Several important policy arguments also support mandatory arbitration for 
employment discrimination claims.  One benefit of mandatory arbitration is 
that it ensures that all claims of discrimination are addressed in some 
manner.173  In 1997, the EEOC received over 80,000 charges of discrimination, 
and its backlog has soared in the past few years.174  Also in 1997, only slightly 
over 11,000 of these cases were resolved on the merits through the judicial 
process.175 
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the EEOC started classifying cases 
according to importance. 176  This means that many valid discrimination claims 
may not receive resolution for several years.177 Some even suggest that the 
EEOC should not handle individual charges and, instead, “use the limited 
resources for routing out systemic unlawful practices.”178  Additionally, 
proponents of arbitration for use in employment discrimination claims argue 
that the judicial process is too costly for many individual employees, and for 
smaller employers.179  Arbitration is a less costly way to resolve complaints of 
discrimination.180 
 
 169. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 240-42 (citing Dunlop Report, supra note 165). 
 170. See Dunlop Report, supra note 165, at 31. 
 171. See id. at 25. 
 172. Id.  In the report, the Commission recognized that there was value to arbitration in 
employment, stating that arbitration was more cost efficient and time efficient for employers than 
the judicial process in many situations.  Additionally, the Commission recognized that arbitration 
is useful for an employee who wants to bring a claim, yet, wants the chance to remain in his/her 
current position.  See id. at 25-26. 
 173. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 245. 
 174. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, All Statutes (last visited Jan. 
10, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html>. 
 175. See id.; see also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 247. 
 176. See Theodore St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 8. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 9.  (“The situation [regarding the backlog of cases at the EEOC] is so bleak that 
Professor Maurice Munroe of the Thomas M. Cooley Law School has recommended, quite 
understandably, that the EEOC get out of the business of handling individual charges. . . .”) 
 179. Id. at 7-8.  The process of arbitration, being simpler and cheaper than the judicial 
process, is very practical for many individuals.  Id.  See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 224. 
 180. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 251. 
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These arguments regarding the fairness and practicalities inherent in the 
judicial process and arbitration help illustrate the problem of what remedies the 
EEOC should be able to seek when there is a binding arbitration agreement.  
The EEOC asserts that it should have the ability to collect monetary relief on 
an individual’s behalf in court, because it views mandatory arbitration as being 
inherently unfair.181  However, others have demonstrated valid counter-
arguments regarding the fairness and efficiency of arbitration.182  Additionally, 
allowing the EEOC to obtain any remedy for an individual employee inhibits 
the finality of the arbitrator’s decision.183  If there is no finality for the 
remedies granted through arbitration, it is unlikely that employers will even 
continue to set forth these agreements.184 Court decisions, coupled with these 
policy arguments, demonstrate the impact that binding arbitration has on the 
EEOC’s request for remedies and why it has become an important problem 
that must be solved. 
F. What Does Gilmer Mean for the EEOC’s Broad Right to Seek Remedies? 
Policy decisions favoring and disfavoring arbitration contribute to the 
problem surrounding the EEOC’s ability to gain monetary relief when there is 
a binding arbitration agreement.185  One must also examine cases following 
Gilmer, relating to the EEOC and its right to seek certain damages, in order to 
gain insight as to what remedies should be available.  Lower courts have issued 
many decisions discussing when the EEOC has the ability to bring a claim 
after an individual has previously litigated a dispute.186  These decisions give 
insight to what should occur when an individual enters a binding arbitration 
agreement, regarding the EEOC’s right to remedies. 
Several circuits have stated that the EEOC is not completely barred from 
bringing a claim, even after an individual has previously litigated the same 
employment discrimination claim.187  The rationale for this is that the EEOC 
 
 181. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra, notes 173-80 and accompanying text. 
 183. See generally St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 8. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See supra notes 148-80 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
 187. See New Orleans Steamship Ass’n v. EEOC, 680 F.3d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1982).  The Fifth 
Circuit held that the EEOC could bring a claim for an action previously litigated by individual 
parties if the EEOC’s challenge was different in some way (e.g. different investigation, different 
relief being sought). Id. at 25-26. 
   See also EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1993).  Here, the court 
affirmed the district court opinion, stating the EEOC could not obtain individual monetary relief 
when an individual had previously litigated his claim.  However, the court stated that prospective 
injunctive relief was still available to the EEOC because it furthered the EEOC’s goal in 
eradicating discrimination for the public interest.  Id. at 1291. 
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brings a claim not only for a private individual’s interest, but also for the 
public interest.188  However, these cases draw substantial lines as to what 
remedies the EEOC may seek when a claim has been previously litigated.189 
In EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., an employee pursued an ADEA claim in 
federal court, receiving an adverse result.190  The EEOC then pursued a 
discrimination claim relating to the same events.191  In U.S. Steel, the Third 
Circuit stated that, “if a person first litigates in his own behalf, that person may 
be precluded from claiming any of the benefits of a judgment in a subsequent 
action that is brought or defended by a party representing him.”192  The court 
held that the doctrine of res judicata applies when the EEOC is representing the 
interests of a private individual.193  The court also reasoned that it would not 
express any view about whether res judicata applies when an individual shares 
 
   See also EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1990).  In U.S. Steel, 
the court held that individuals who had fully litigated claims pursuant to the ADEA could not 
obtain individual relief in actions by the EEOC.  Id. at 495. 
 188. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291.  The EEOC emphasized that there is a difference 
between suing on behalf of the employee’s personal interest, and suing on behalf of the public 
interest.  The court stated that an individual could not further the public interest by his litigation 
in the same way that the EEOC could further the public interest.  Therefore, the court held that 
the EEOC could still sue on behalf of the public interest.  Id.  See also U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 495. 
 189. See supra notes 187-88. 
 190. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 491. 
 191. Id.  Several employees filed a class action alleging that their employer had violated the 
ADEA regarding the payment of a pension.  Id.  The EEOC also filed an action alleging unlawful 
employment practices under the ADEA, regarding the same pension payments.  Id.  U.S. Steel 
argued that some of these employees were not entitled to further retroactive relief because they 
had settled their ADEA claims and were, therefore, precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from 
receiving other remedies.  Id.  The EEOC conceded that the employees who had previously 
settled their claims should not receive prejudgment interest from the EEOC action.  Id. at 492.  
Accordingly, the question before the Third Circuit was “whether res judicata bars the award of 
individual relief for the former employees who previously litigated their ADEA claim and 
suffered an adverse final judgment.” Id. at 490. 
 192. Id. at 493. 
 193. See id. at 494.  The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, has been applied in this 
case.  In order to show that a claim should be precluded, it is necessary to demonstrate that “there 
has been 1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving 2) the same claim and 3) the 
same parties or their privies.”  Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Athlone Ind., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 
983 (3d Cir. 1984)).  The court decided that the first two elements were present because there was 
a final judgment on the merits by an individual claimant, and it related to the same issues for 
which the EEOC is suing.  However, the parties are not in privity when the EEOC is suing for the 
public interest.  See U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 496. 
  See id. at 494-95.  The court stated that it was convinced that Congress would not have 
cut off the right of an individual to institute a private action once the EEOC has instituted an 
action unless it believed that the EEOC could adequately represent the interest of the individual, 
enforcing the individual’s rights.  Id. 
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in the benefits of an EEOC claim, because then, the EEOC was attempting only 
to serve the public interest.194 
The Seventh Circuit followed the U.S. Steel rationale and held that an 
adverse judgment in an individual’s ADEA claim precluded the EEOC from 
seeking monetary relief on an employee’s behalf.195  The court determined that 
the EEOC was not barred from bringing a claim for equitable relief, such as an 
injunction prohibiting future discrimination, because the public interest in 
stopping discrimination in the workplace would be served.196  Furthermore, the 
court addressed the apparent inconsistency of allowing the EEOC to pursue 
one type of relief and not another.197  The court reasoned that a private 
individual could not adequately represent the interest of the EEOC in 
protecting the public from an employer’s discriminatory behavior.198  Only the 
EEOC could pursue this interest adequately, by seeking equitable relief against 
future violations.199  Consequently, the EEOC was not barred from seeking 
injunctive relief by res judicata principles.200 
Through the examination of statutory authority granted to the EEOC and 
the case law interpreting these statutes, it is clear that the EEOC has been 
delegated an increasingly substantial amount of authority to stop workplace 
discrimination.201  This authority protects the public interest, and the interests 
of private individuals.202  Through judicial decision-making and federal 
statutes, it is also clear that the EEOC may be barred from claiming damages 
for an individual if that individual has already fully litigated his claim.203 
 
 194. Id. at 496. 
 195. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing U.S. 
Steel, 921 F.2d at 493). 
 196. See U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 496; Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291.  In Harris Chernin, the 
court affirmed that individual litigation barred the EEOC from seeking back pay and other 
individual damages.  However, it allowed the EEOC to sue for injunctive relief, as long as the 
EEOC could demonstrate a violation of the ADEA against the employee.  See id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id.  The court in Harris Chernin noted the distinction made by the U.S. Steel court 
between the individual protections provided by the EEOC and the public interest protections 
provided by the EEOC.  Then, the Harris Chernin court reached the conclusion that the EEOC 
could not be barred when seeking an injunction to prevent further violations because this remedy 
protects the public interest, not the interests of the private individual.  Id. 
 199. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291. 
 200. Id.  It is noteworthy that the EEOC has the ability to represent adequately all of the 
interests of individual employees. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 301 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 201. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text. 
 202. See generally EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 203. See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text. 
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No court has held that the EEOC should be bound to arbitrate when an 
employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement.204  However, two recent 
decisions have precluded the EEOC from obtaining the monetary remedy in 
court because individuals entered a binding arbitration agreement; a third 
decision disagreed, creating a split in authority.  These decisions are discussed 
in Part III.205 
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT DEVELOPS 
A. The Second and Fourth Circuits Views: The EEOC Cannot Seek Monetary 
Relief on behalf of an Individual who has Signed a Binding Arbitration 
Agreement 
1. The Second Circuit: EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody and Co. 
In 1992, the EEOC claimed that Kidder, Peabody & Company (Kidder), 
violated the ADEA by engaging in a pattern of terminating older employees 
because of their age.  The EEOC sought liquidated damages, back pay, and 
reinstatement on behalf of seventeen former Kidder employees.206  As a 
requirement of employment at Kidder, nine of those employees had signed 
agreements mandating arbitration.207  Three of those nine employees arbitrated 
their claims.  The arbitrator did not award any damages and stated that Kidder 
had not violated the ADEA.208  The EEOC later stipulated that it only sought 
monetary damages on behalf of the nine employees who had signed arbitration 
agreements.209  Kidder filed a motion to dismiss stating the EEOC should be 
precluded from obtaining any monetary remedy on behalf of an employee who 
had signed a binding arbitration agreement.210  Additionally, Kidder argued 
that under Gilmer, the employees who signed agreements to arbitrate had 
waived their right to a monetary award from the court.211  The district court 
 
 204. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1999).  The court 
recognized that Title VII and the ADA do not imply that the EEOC must participate in 
arbitration.  Here, the EEOC was not even a party to the arbitration agreement, so it could not be 
forced to arbitrate for any reason.  Id. 
 205. See infra notes 206-68. 
 206. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998).  See also EEOC v. 
Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 979 F. Supp. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 207. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300.  The arbitration agreement that the employees signed was 
the same agreement signed in Gilmer.  It is called the U-4 registration form and is used by the 
NYSE.  Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 300.  The EEOC changed the remedies it was seeking because Kidder discontinued 
its business in investment banking, therefore, there was no need for equitable relief, such as 
reinstatement.  The EEOC sought liquidated damages and back pay.  Id. 
 210. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300. 
 211. Kidder, 979 F. Supp. at 247 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28). 
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agreed with Kidder’s argument and granted its motion to dismiss the claim.212  
The court held that “to allow the EEOC to recover monetary damages would 
frustrate the purpose of the FAA because an employee, having signed the 
agreement to arbitrate, could avoid arbitration by having the EEOC file in the 
federal forum seeking back pay on his or her behalf.”213  The EEOC 
appealed.214 
In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit decided how a binding 
arbitration agreement should impact the EEOC’s power to enforce anti-
discrimination laws and seek all statutory remedies.  The majority opinion held 
that the EEOC could not pursue purely monetary relief on behalf of an 
employee who signed a binding arbitration agreement and dismissed the 
claim.215  The majority stated that the “clear implication of Gilmer is that the 
EEOC may not seek monetary relief on behalf of claimants who have entered 
valid arbitration agreements.”216  The majority recognized that in Gilmer, 
arbitration agreements did not preclude the EEOC from investigating a charge 
of discrimination, nor did these agreements prevent individuals from filing 
charges with the EEOC.217  Additionally, the court looked to previous 
decisions to determine that the EEOC could not seek a monetary remedy on 
behalf of an employee who has settled, waived, or previously litigated his or 
her discrimination claim.218  The court reasoned that this also meant that a 
prior submission by an individual to an arbitration agreement precluded the 
EEOC from seeking monetary relief on an employee’s behalf.219 
The majority recognized that the EEOC had a valid interest in protecting 
the public by stopping discrimination and in serving the needs of private 
individuals.220  However, the majority reasoned that the EEOC would still have 
 
 212. See id. 
 213. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing the 
district court opinion in Kidder, 979 F. Supp. at 247). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 303.  In Kidder, the court stated that by allowing an individual to reap the 
benefits of a suit by the EEOC through receipt of monetary damages, that individual is able to 
make an “end run around the arbitration agreement . . . undermin[ing] the Gilmer decision and the 
FAA.”  Id. 
 216. Id. at 301. 
 217. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 301. 
 218. See id. (citing Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988); Moore v. 
McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1986); Runyan v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 
787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 850 (1986)). 
 219. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 301. 
 220. See id. at 303.  The court concluded, stating, “In sum, this case presents competing 
public interests— the interest in allowing the EEOC broad authority to pursue actions to eradicate 
and prevent employment discrimination and the interest in encouraging parties to arbitrate.” Id.  
The court further stated that monetary relief does not affect the public interest to the same degree 
as injunctive relief.  See id. at 301. 
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the ability to serve the public interest without pursuing any monetary remedy 
because it had several equitable remedies available in protecting the public 
from discriminatory behavior.221  The majority explained that this decision 
struck the right balance between the EEOC’s interest and the policy favoring 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.222 
Finally, the court stated that its decision was a sound one because an 
individual who signed an arbitration agreement should not be permitted to gain 
any relief from a court action by the EEOC.223  This would allow the individual 
to “make an end run around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC 
pursue back pay or liquidated damages.”224  The court implied that by allowing 
this, the arbitration process would become meaningless and agreements would 
be ineffective, thereby undermining Gilmer and the FAA.225 
Judge Feinberg’s concurrence in Kidder is interesting because it 
foreshadows the possibility of a split in opinions regarding whether the EEOC 
is able to seek individual monetary relief.  The concurrence raised additional 
arguments regarding the EEOC’s right to obtain monetary damages.226  Judge 
Feinberg started his opinion by stating that he believed the decision was 
correct, given the governing case law.227  However, he went on to conclude 
that he would have decided the case differently if the court had written on a 
“clean slate.”228  Judge Feinberg’s opinion expressed concerns about whether 
ADEA rights could be thoroughly vindicated in arbitration.  He expressed 
concerns as to whether monetary relief is as useful as equitable relief for the 
EEOC in pursuing its goal of protecting the public from discriminatory 
behavior.229  He noted that smaller monetary awards are usually received 
through arbitration rather than through the court process.230  Additionally, 
Judge Feinberg disagreed with the majority that allowing monetary damages 
would cause individuals to make an “end run around the arbitration 
 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id.  The court recognized that this decision does not eliminate the possibility of 
monetary damages altogether.  Instead, it limits the individual who has signed a binding 
arbitration agreement to receive monetary damages only through the arbitration process.  See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303. 
 225. See id. at 302-03. 
 226. See id. at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring). 
 227. See id.  Judge Feinberg stated, “I concur because I believe that the majority opinion 
correctly reads the import of Gilmer. . . .”  Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304. 
 230. See id.  Judge Feinberg stated, “I find it eminently plausible that on the risk of a single, 
large award, in an EEOC case brought on behalf of multiple employees would be a greater 
deterrent to illegal conduct than the risk of multiple smaller awards obtained by the employees 
through arbitration . . . .”  Id. 
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agreement.”231  He discussed the large caseload and the limited resources of 
the EEOC,232 suggesting that the EEOC simply would not have the ability to 
pursue a majority of discrimination claims by individuals who entered 
mandatory arbitration agreements.233  Therefore, it would be unlikely that 
individuals could make an “end run around” an arbitration agreement.234  He 
concluded by suggesting that a uniform solution to this problem should be 
reached quickly.  However, Judge Feinberg left it to Congress or the Supreme 
Court to promulgate this solution, not the Second Circuit.235 
2. The Fourth Circuit: EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 
On October 6, 1999, the Fourth Circuit interpreted and followed Kidder, 
stating that an employee who signed a binding arbitration agreement could not 
recover monetary damages when the EEOC pursued the claim in its own 
name.236  In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., employee Eric Baker was discharged 
after suffering a seizure at work.237  The separation notice stated that for “[the 
employee’s] benefit and safety and [the safety of] Waffle House, it would be 
best he not work here anymore.”238  After termination, Mr. Baker filed charges 
with the EEOC.239  The EEOC sued under the ADA, requesting a permanent 
injunction to bar Waffle House from any future discrimination based on 
disability, back pay and reinstatement on behalf of the former employee, 
compensation for losses, and punitive damages.240  Waffle House responded by 
filing a petition to compel arbitration arguing that the employee signed a 
binding arbitration agreement before he was hired.241  Waffle House contended 
that the EEOC had no right to sue because it was bound by the employee’s 
 
 231. See generally Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303.  Compare with Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304 
(Feinberg, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority on the issue of whether a claim by the 
EEOC would allow an employee to circumvent an arbitration agreement). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. at 303. 
 234. Id.  Judge Feinberg disagrees with the majority by stating, “I do not think it is likely that 
the EEOC will pursue monetary damages simply to accommodate employees seeking to avoid 
arbitration. . . .” Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 237. Id. at 807. 
 238. See id.  The belief is that the employee suffered the seizure due to a change in 
medication that could have been easily corrected.  Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id., 193 F.3d at 807-08. 
 241. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808. 
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arbitration agreement.242  The EEOC argued that it had never agreed to 
arbitrate, and should be allowed to pursue all remedies available by statute.243 
The Fourth Circuit majority held that when the EEOC pursued equitable 
relief, it was protecting the public interest.244  The court allowed the EEOC to 
seek equitable relief, notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement.245  The 
court, however, refused to allow the EEOC to obtain monetary damages on 
behalf of Mr. Baker because of the arbitration clause.246  The majority stated 
that nothing in the ADA, or any other statute delegating authority to the EEOC, 
implies that the EEOC is held to an arbitration agreement when an employee 
has entered this type of agreement.247  The court stated that under Gilmer, the 
individual could arbitrate to receive individual remedies.248  For these reasons, 
the Waffle House court determined that the EEOC could not seek a monetary 
remedy on an individual’s behalf.249 
A. A New View of Binding Arbitration Agreements:  The Sixth Circuit View 
in EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery and Crafts 
The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc. repeated 
many of the same arguments articulated by Judge Feinberg in Kidder to reach a 
conclusion opposite to those reached by the Second and Fourth Circuits.250  In 
 
 242. See id.  On appeal, Waffle House argued that the arbitration agreement between Mr. 
Baker and Waffle House binds the EEOC to pursue any connected claims in arbitration.  Id. 
 243. See id. at 809. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id.  The court stated: 
Thus, we hold that to the extent that the EEOC seeks ‘a permanent injunction enjoining 
[Waffle House] from discharging individuals and engaging in other employment practice 
which discriminates on the basis of disability’ the EEOC is pursuing the public interest in 
a discrimination-free workplace, and it must be allowed to do so in federal court, as 
authorized by the ADA . . . . 
See id. at 812-13. 
 246. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809.  In Waffle House, the court recognized that the EEOC 
has never entered an agreement to arbitrate, and thus cannot be held to the employee’s arbitration 
agreement.  Additionally, the court recognized that in Gilmer, the Supreme Court demonstrated 
that “the EEOC, acting in its public role, is not bound by private arbitration agreements.”  Id.  In 
Waffle House, the court went on to state that this means that the EEOC can file a suit to 
accomplish societal goals of protecting the public interest.  See id. at 811. 
  However, the court then holds that the EEOC cannot “trample this strong [federal] policy 
favoring arbitration” by pursuing damages on the individual’s behalf.  Id. at 812. 
  It is noteworthy that one Judge did dissent in Waffle House.  However, his dissent related 
to the belief that the mandatory arbitration agreement was faulty, and, therefore, non-binding on 
Mr. Baker.  See id. at 813-18 (King, J., dissenting). 
 247. See id. at 809. 
 248. See id. at 807. 
 249. See id. 
 250. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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Frank’s Nursery, the Sixth Circuit held that the EEOC was not barred from 
bringing a claim requesting injunctive or monetary relief on the employee’s 
behalf.251  As was stated in the Introduction, Carol Adams, an African-
American employee, signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of her 
employment at Frank’s. 252  After being passed over for a new position, Adams 
filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that she had been passed over 
because she was an African-American.253 After failed conciliation attempts, the 
EEOC sued Frank’s in the district court requesting equitable relief, back pay, 
and compensatory and punitive damages on Adams’ behalf.254  Frank’s moved 
to dismiss, stating that Adams was obligated to arbitrate and to receive any 
remedy through arbitration, as set forth by the agreement.255 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision dismissing all of the 
EEOC’s claims regarding injunctive and monetary relief.256  The court first 
discussed the EEOC’s right to pursue injunctive relief, holding that several 
other courts have recognized the EEOC’s right to gain this relief after an 
individual had previously litigated.257  The court reasoned that this meant the 
EEOC could receive injunctive relief notwithstanding an employee’s 
arbitration agreement.258  The court analyzed previous decisions to hold that 
without an ability to pursue this type of relief, the EEOC could not properly 
protect the public interest.259 
The court also stated that there was no inconsistency between the holding 
of Gilmer and allowing the EEOC to pursue monetary relief on Adams’ 
behalf.260  The Sixth Circuit held that res judicata principles are inapplicable to 
binding arbitration agreements and the EEOC’s right to sue for monetary 
damages for two reasons.  First, the court stated that the EEOC cannot be 
barred by res judicata principles because the EEOC and the individual 
 
 251. See id. at 453. 
 252. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452-53. 
 254. See id. at 452.  The EEOC requested an injunction to prevent future discrimination at 
Frank’s, and it requested an order by the court to institute policies providing equal employment 
opportunities to African-Americans, as well as damages.  See id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See supra note 187. 
 258. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 259. See id.  The court stated that the interest of the EEOC in protecting the public outweighs 
the private promise to arbitrate.  See id. 
 260. See id. at 461. The majority in Frank’s Nursery held that “While Gilmer stated that 
‘arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class wide or 
equitable relief,’ we do not read the Court’s language as excluding other kinds of relief.” Id.  
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)). 
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employee do not share the same interests.261  Second, the court distinguished 
this situation from prior cases where res judicata barred the second suit in a 
discrimination claim, by explaining that all of the previous cases involved a 
previously litigated or settled claim.262  In Frank’s Nursery, Adams had not 
previously litigated the claim, nor did she give up her right to back pay or other 
damages through settlement.263 
Finally, the majority rejected the Second Circuit’s view, that by allowing 
the EEOC to pursue a monetary remedy, a private individual could “make an 
end run around the arbitration agreement.”264  Similar to the argument in Judge 
Feinberg’s concurring opinion in Kidder, the Sixth Circuit stated that the 
EEOC has the power to decide what claims it will litigate and what claims it 
will not pursue.265  An individual has no way of knowing if the EEOC will 
bring an action on his behalf.266  The Frank’s Nursery majority concluded by 
stating that Congress would not have delegated the EEOC any authority to 
obtain monetary damages if it thought that the EEOC could effectively 
eliminate employment discrimination with only injunctive relief.267 
The differences between litigation and arbitration make the ultimate 
resolution of this issue important to the EEOC, employers, and employees.  
Although the opinions vary greatly, all three opinions rely on valid judicial 
decision-making, statutory evidence, and policy arguments to reach different 
conclusions.268  Additionally, the opinions in all three circuits are concerned 
with the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest and the individual’s 
interest. Each also expresses a desire to conform to the strong federal policy 
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. What is the best way to 
resolve this split in authority for the benefit of all involved parties? 
 
 261. See id. at 463.  The EEOC serves two competing interests so it must be authorized to 
“proceed in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory overall relief . . . .” Id. (citing 
General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)). 
 262. See id.  (“[T]here is no question that the present case does not involve a prior suit or even 
a prior arbitration that raised or resolved the issues raised in the EEOC’s complaint.”) 
 263. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 463. 
 264. See id. at 468 (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 
1998)). 
 265. Id. at 468 (citing General Tel., 446 U.S. at 326). 
 266. See id. 
 267. Id. at 467.  The majority in Frank’s Nursery believes that injunctive and monetary relief 
are both necessary in the EEOC’s goal of protecting the public interest.  Id. 
 268. See generally supra notes 206-35 and accompanying text; supra notes 236-49 and 
accompanying text; supra notes 250-67 and accompanying text.  These notes and text highlight 
the different arguments that could be raised regarding the remedies problem. 
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IV. THE EEOC’S ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE 
WORKPLACE:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
By balancing the federal interest in enforcing arbitration agreements and 
the EEOC’s interest in protecting individuals and the public, the best solution 
to this problem is the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Waffle House.269  Here, the 
Fourth Circuit allowed the EEOC to seek equitable relief on behalf of the 
public interest.270  The Fourth Circuit has also adequately balanced the interest 
favoring arbitration by barring the EEOC from seeking a monetary remedy 
when there is a binding arbitration agreement.271  The decision in Waffle House 
is logical because it allows the EEOC to enforce general anti-discrimination 
principles, while demonstrating that courts should enforce binding arbitration 
agreements.272  Additionally, this decision provides a result that is beneficial to 
the EEOC, employers, and employees.273 
In this section, Part A will explain why the EEOC must be allowed to seek 
injunctive relief and how this benefits employers, employees, and the 
EEOC.274  The necessity for barring the EEOC from its pursuit of monetary 
relief, after an employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement, is 
discussed in Part B.275 
A. The Importance of the EEOC’s Ability to Seek Injunctive Relief on Behalf 
of the Public Interest, notwithstanding an Arbitration Agreement 
The EEOC must have an ability to seek equitable relief for the protection 
of the public interest, in order to effectively enforce anti-discrimination 
laws.276  It is widely recognized that “the EEOC cannot be viewed as merely an 
institutional surrogate for individual victims of discrimination.”277  The EEOC 
must also protect the public interest through its enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws.278  Availability of equitable relief on behalf of the public 
allows the EEOC to combat discrimination at a societal level, without 
 
 269. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 270. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 813. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See infra notes 295-308 and accompanying text. 
 274. See infra notes 276-94 and accompanying text. 
 275. See infra notes 295-322 and accompanying text. 
 276. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999).  These equitable 
remedies include, but are not limited to, an injunction prohibiting an employer from 
discriminating in the future or an order to carry out anti-discrimination policies.  See id. 
 277. See id. (citing General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)). 
 278. See General Tel., 446 U.S. at 326. 
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undermining the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.279 
Additionally, allowing the EEOC to seek equitable relief to protect the 
public interest is consistent with judicial decision-making.280  As Justice 
White’s majority opinion in Gilmer recognized, an individual who signs a 
binding arbitration agreement is not prevented from filing a charge with the 
EEOC.281  Additionally, the majority in Gilmer held that the EEOC is not 
prevented from investigating that charge.282  Gilmer recognized that when an 
individual signs an arbitration agreement, the EEOC does not lose all power to 
enforce anti-discrimination principles.283 
Allowing the EEOC to obtain equitable relief on behalf of the public 
interest is also consistent with decisions after Gilmer.284  In EEOC v. Harris 
Chernin, the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC could seek injunctive relief 
on behalf of the public interest, even after an individual had litigated his claim 
following the rationale set forth by the Third Circuit in U.S. Steel.285  However, 
in Harris Chernin the Seventh Circuit stated that the EEOC could not seek 
relief on the individual’s behalf when the individual had previously litigated 
and received an adverse judgment.286  The court stated that it was necessary to 
allow the EEOC to seek injunctive relief to adequately enforce anti-
discrimination laws for the public interest.287  Therefore, providing for 
equitable relief on behalf of the public interest, notwithstanding a binding 
arbitration agreement, is consistent with judicial decision-making. 
Additionally, permitting injunctive relief promotes the EEOC’s interest in 
having access to the judicial process notwithstanding an individual employee’s 
agreement to arbitrate.288  In its 1997 Policy Statement, the EEOC stated that 
one reason it disapproved of arbitration for employment discrimination claims 
was due to the private nature of arbitration.289  By allowing the EEOC to seek 
 
 279. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811-12 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
 280. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811-12. 
 281. See id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32). 
 282. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990); see also EEOC v. 
Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).  See generally supra notes 185-200 and 
accompanying text. 
 285. Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291.  See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291. 
 288. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28.  One of the reasons that the EEOC opposes mandatory 
arbitration agreements in employment discrimination is because it believes that arbitration takes 
away from the publicity associated with the judicial process and discrimination claims.  Id. 
 289. See supra notes 154-59. 
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relief on behalf of the public interest, an employer’s discriminating behavior is 
exposed to the public through the court process.290 
Finally, it has been recognized that an individual’s workplace 
discrimination suit is not intended to accomplish the EEOC’s interest in 
protecting the public.291  Only the EEOC can adequately protect this interest.292  
Therefore, the EEOC must have the ability to file its own claim on behalf of 
the public interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws.293 
Balancing the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the EEOC’s 
interest in enforcing anti-discrimination principles, it is clear that the EEOC 
must have the ability to seek equitable relief on the public’s behalf for the 
reasons stated above.294  However, the EEOC’s ability to seek damages on an 
individual’s behalf undermines the policy favoring arbitration in a way that 
cannot be advocated. 
B. The EEOC Should Not have the Ability to Seek Damages on Behalf of an 
Individual who Enters a Binding Arbitration Agreement 
A policy barring the EEOC from obtaining a monetary remedy is 
beneficial and logical.  This policy benefits employers, employees, and the 
EEOC in substantial ways. There are several reasons why an individual 
monetary remedy should not be allowed in this situation. 
1. Binding Arbitration Agreements: Beneficial to Employers and 
Employees 
Although many special interest groups do not authorize the use of 
mandatory arbitration agreements,295 the number of employers using, or 
considering the use of these kinds of agreements is rising.296  In determining 
 
 290. Id. 
 291. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Harris 
Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d at 1291).  In Waffle House, the majority held, that, “[I]nterests are broader 
than those of the individuals injured by discrimination. . . private litigants cannot adequately 
represent the government’s interest in enforcing the prohibitions of federal statutes.” Waffle 
House, 193 F.3d at 809 (quoting Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291). 
 292. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811. 
 293. See generally id. 
 294. See supra notes 276-93 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.  These groups include the EEOC, the 
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Dunlop Commission, although the Dunlop Commission 
states that there are benefits to binding arbitration agreements.  See supra notes 165-72 and 
accompanying text. 
 296. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 80.  Many employers have been prompted to use 
arbitration because it is typically more predictable, faster, and less costly than the judicial process.  
See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 235-36.  Here, Professor FitzGibbon states that “[w]hether 
increasing numbers of employers will offer or mandate arbitration to resolve these [employment] 
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what remedies should be available to the EEOC when there is a binding 
arbitration agreement, it is important to analyze why employers find value in 
these agreements.297  Employers use mandatory arbitration agreements because 
they want finality in disputes involving their employees.298  If the EEOC is 
able to seek monetary damages, arbitration agreements will lose the finality 
aspect that makes them appealing to employers.299  If employers realize that 
the EEOC has an ability to seek damages on behalf of employees, employers 
may discontinue use of these agreements.300 
It is important that employers use arbitration agreements because they are 
not only beneficial for employers, but they are also beneficial for employees.301  
Suppose an employee brings a claim that the employer believes is insignificant 
and lacks merit.  Due to the EEOC’s backlog, there is a great probability that if 
the EEOC decides to pursue the claim, this claim may not receive the EEOC’s 
attention for several years.302  The EEOC has extremely limited resources and 
a large caseload.303  These two factors combine to make it highly improbable 
that an individual could “make an end run around the arbitration 
agreement,”304 as was suggested by the majority in Kidder.305  However, given 
the EEOC’s large caseload, an alternate forum should be encouraged for the 
benefit of all parties, including the EEOC.306  Arbitration agreements actually 
help many employees with claims that may not be addressed by the EEOC in 
court.307  If agreements are not binding, an employer may recognize the 
EEOC’s backlog and realize that an employee filing with the EEOC would 
 
disputes is an open question . . . .”  Id.  However, it is still recognized that employers are 
considering mandatory arbitration as one option in resolving work-related disputes.  See id. 
 297. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.  Some of the major reasons that 
employers use mandatory arbitration agreements are because they can be cost-efficient and 
speedy, when compared with the judicial process.  Additionally, employers like the finality of 
mandatory arbitration agreements.  See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. Notwithstanding limited judicial review of arbitration awards, employers use arbitration 
agreements with a belief that after the arbitration process has ceased, the claim has been resolved 
with finality.  If the EEOC is able to seek damages, this would not be the case.  See generally 
note 184 and accompanying text. 
 300. See generally FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 248. 
 301. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 7.  Professor St. Antoine summarized that, “The case 
for allowing mandatory arbitration—permitting employers to condition employment upon an 
employee’s agreement to arbitrate rather than litigate workplace claims, including statutory rights 
against discrimination—is counter-intuitive and highly practical.”  Id. 
 302. See generally McArthur, supra note 56, at 882. 
 303. See generally <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html>.  Between 1992 and 1998 the EEOC 
has received between approximately 72,000 and 92,000 cases each year.  Id. 
 304. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 305. See id. 
 306. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 7. 
 307. See id. 
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likely become lost in thousands of claims waiting to be investigated and 
litigated.308  Employees are protected by the binding nature of arbitration 
agreements, because this assures a forum in which they may proceed with all 
employment discrimination claims. 
2. Barring the EEOC’s Pursuit of a Monetary Remedy: Enforcing Anti-
Discrimination Principles and Enforcing Agreements to Arbitrate 
Barring the EEOC from seeking damages on behalf of an employee who 
has signed a binding arbitration agreement is also consistent with judicial 
decisions.  The majority opinions in Mitsubishi309 and Gilmer,310 advocate the 
arbitration of statutory claims, unless Congress demonstrates a statutory intent 
not to allow arbitration.311  In Gilmer and Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court 
described the healthy regard for the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
. . .,” demonstrating that this policy would be undermined if the Court did not 
enforce the agreements to arbitrate.312 
When the EEOC is trying to obtain damages on an individual’s behalf, the 
EEOC’s interest in protecting the public is minimal.313  In Waffle House, the 
majority repeated the statement from Gilmer that the EEOC could investigate 
an individual’s claims of discriminatory behavior.314  Additionally, in Harris 
Chernin, the court recognized that the EEOC could obtain relief on behalf of 
the public interest when an individual had previously litigated a claim.315  The 
court in Harris Chernin allowed the EEOC to seek only equitable relief, stating 
that this relief adequately fulfilled the EEOC’s goal of protecting the public 
interest from workplace discrimination.316  Although the problem involving a 
binding arbitration contract is different from a situation where an individual 
has litigated a claim, the implication from the Harris Chernin decision is that 
equitable relief is sufficient to protect the public interest.317 
 
 308. See id. 
 309. See supra notes 89-102. 
 310. See supra notes 118-43. 
 311. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646 (1985).  
Here, the court states that if there is nothing in the legislative history or the text precluding 
arbitration as a remedy, it should not be precluded.  Id.  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991). 
 312. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 313. See generally EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 314. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gilmer, 
500 U.S. at 32). 
 315. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
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Additionally, courts have demonstrated that there is no longer a justified 
fear or suspicion regarding arbitration.318  Several courts have recognized that 
there are safeguards in place to ensure fairness.319  As long as these safeguards 
continue to be in place, there is no reason why these arbitration agreements 
should not be enforced. 
It is true that barring the EEOC from seeking damages on behalf of an 
individual who has signed a binding arbitration contract does take away one of 
the EEOC’s methods of enforcing anti-discrimination principles.320  Under the 
proposed solution, however, the EEOC is still able to seek injunctive relief on 
behalf of the public interest.321 It follows that this should be an adequate 
remedy to protect the public interest when an employee has signed a binding 
arbitration agreement.  Additionally, if employees entering a binding 
arbitration agreement are able to gain remedies through the EEOC, it will 
destroy the finality and efficiency purposes for having the agreement in the 
employer’s eyes.322 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed solution is fair for all parties involved in the scenario 
beginning this Comment.  It ensures that the employee’s termination because 
of her race may be vindicated by the EEOC’s pursuit of equitable relief.  This 
type of relief also enables the EEOC to protect the public and enforce federal 
anti-discrimination provisions.  At the same time, enforcement of the 
agreement to arbitrate strengthens the federal policy promoting arbitration, as 
well as allowing each party to pursue his or her own interests efficiently and 
justly while still resolving the claim with finality. 
Allowing the EEOC to pursue only equitable relief on behalf of the public 
interest when an individual has signed a binding arbitration agreement is a 
solution that is also consistent with judicial decision-making.323  It is also 
beneficial to the EEOC, employers, and employees.324  Therefore, the solution 
has a substantial chance of being successfully implemented at the national 
level.  However, in order for this solution to work, it is important to realize that 
employers must take safeguards to ensure fairness, efficiency, and due process 
 
 318. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)). 
 319. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.  In the FAA, there are provisions providing 
for judicial review of arbitration decisions.  Id.  Additionally, the NYSE has adopted its own 
regulations to ensure fairness in arbitration.  See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31. 
 320. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 307-08. 
 323. See supra notes 280-87. 
 324. See supra notes 295-319. 
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for all parties.325  There have already been steps taken to ensure this fairness in 
the FAA and the NYSE rules regarding arbitration.326  The suggestions made 
by the Dunlop Commission would also assist employers in ensuring that 
arbitration is fair to all parties.327 
This solution should be implemented on a national level because it 
involves arbitration in employment, a national issue.328  Because the EEOC 
enforces anti-discrimination practices throughout the nation it is very important 
to have a uniform implementation of remedies when the EEOC seeks relief in 
the context of a binding arbitration agreement.  There is also a substantial 
public interest in stopping employment discrimination that should be treated 
equally throughout the United States.329  Thus, as Judge Feinberg opined in 
Kidder, the decision should be regulated by statute or by the Supreme Court to 
ensure its uniformity.330 
JULIE L. WATERS 
 
 325. See generally Dunlop Report, supra note 165. 
 326. See id. at 31. 
 327. See id. 
 328. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998) (Feinberg, J., 
concurring). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
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